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Funded  mandatory  pension  systems  based  on individual  accounts  are spreading  around  the
world.  With  the maturation  of those  systems,  regulating  the withdrawal  of retirement  savings
will  become  increasingly  important.  Govemment  regulation  of  withdrawals  should  mandate  the
purchase  of  inflation-indexed  life  annuities  exceeding  income  available  from  government  welfare
programs  for the retiree  and potential  survivors.  However,  proper  functioning  of insurance
markets  does  not require  annuitizing  the entire  account  balance.  Instead,  more  flexibility  for  the
choice  of withdrawals  could  be permitted  for any  remaining  funds,  helping  to tailor  income
streams  to individual  needs  and  living  arrangements.
Author's  E-Mail  Address:  jwalliser@imnforg
I The  views  expressed  in  the  paper  are  those  of  the  author  and  not  necessarily  those  of  the  Intemational
Monetary  Fund.  The  author  thanks  Matthew  Berger,  Luis  Cubeddu,  Edouard  Maciejewski,  and  Joachim
Wmter  for  helpful  cornments.- 2 -
I.  INTRODUCTION
Mandatory pension systems based on  individual accounts are spreading around the
world. Following the Chilean example of the  early 1980s, many Latin American countries
including  Argentina,  Colombia,  Mexico,  and Peru have introduced individual  account systems  in
the 1990s. Eastern Europe and the former Soviet  Republics  in Asia constitute a second region
with major reform activity, although reforms have often been less far-reaching  than in Latin
America. The major driving force behind most reform programs was the imminent financial
problem of the countries'  traditional  pay-as-you-go  systems.
Under the new systems,  workers set aside earnings in individual  accounts, which later
replace  some or all of the previously  pay-as-you-go  financed pensions. During the accunulation
phase workers  invest a percentage  of their income in approved investment  products.  Following
retirement workers withdraw the accumulated  assets to  finance consumption in old age.  In
addition to  the  retirement income financed with individual accounts ("second pillar"), the
govenmment  generally  offers a general-revenue  financed benefit (<first  pillar") in form of a basic
pension or a welfare  program for workers  without sufficient  resources.
Quite naturally,  much of the initial interest in designing  the new pension systems has
been focused on the accumulation  phase. Details concerning how much money to  set aside,
where to invest it,  how to regulate  investment companies and investment  portfolios, and what
type of survivor and disability  insurance  to establish  have drawn much attention.  The Chilean
system, for example,  features  a 10 percent contribution  rate for individual  accounts, and imposes
fairly  tight regulation  on investment  portfolios,  investment  returns, and charges.
With the maturity  of individual  account systems,  policy  questions surrounding  the design
of the withdrawal  phase will require more attention. Standard pay-as-you-go  systems generally
offer an inflation-indexed  pension for the duration of a worker's life.  Can private insurance
markets replicate such a pensior-called  a life annuity-at  reasonable cost?  What flexibility
should retirees have in  choosing insurance products that  convert their retirement account
balance  in retirement income? What form of government oversight  and regulation  would strike
a  reasonable balance between the interests of retirees and  taxpayers who  finance income
protection programs? Those are among the core questions that policymakers  face in reform
countnes.
The major conclusions  of the discussion  are the following: Optimal income allocation  in
old  age depends on  a large number of factors including the income received from other
pensions, bequest motives and family arrangements,  health and long-term care issues, housing,
investment portfolio choices,  and inflation  protection. Therefore, weak observable life annuity
demand in many industrialized  countries does not necessarily  indicate insurance market failure.
Nonetheless, governnent regulation of the withdrawal of account balances should ensure an
inflation-protected  stream of income for the retiree and potential survivors  that exceeds income
available from government welfare programs.  More flexibility  for the  choice of insurance
product could be permitted for the remaining  account balance,  helping to tailor income streams
to individual  needs and arrangements.The paper proceeds  in two sections.  It first discusses  issues of consumption in old age.
Starting with a simple model, different model extensions and their impact on the  optimal
consumption choice are outlined.  The first part also reviews the importance of insurance
market failure  vis-a-vis  other explanations  for observable  weak life annuity demand. Drawing  on
the conclusions  of the first section,  the second part lays  out options for policymakers  and weighs
their respective  advantages  and disadvantages.
II.  INCOME  AND CONSUMPTION  IN OLD  AGE
The  goal of pension programs is to provide a stream of income in  old age that is
sufficient to meet consumption needs.  To evaluate  which insurance  products and withdrawal
regulations could help to  meet retirees' needs, it is important to  gain an understanding of
optimal  choices and how they vary in different settings.  Consumption in old-age can be affected
by a variety of circumstances,  including uncertainty about the life span, the functioning of
insurance  markets, family  arrangements,  health risks,  and fluctuations  in the rate of return.
A  Sipe  Model  of CGnpt  All  an
Suppose workers reach retirement age with wealth Wt, which includes the  savings in
individual  accounts. Workers would like to allocate  this wealth over the remaining  years of life
to ensure that consumption  needs can be met.  In deciding  how much to consume in each year,
workers take into account that they might die at the end of year t with probability (i-G+,) and
might  survive to year t+ 1 with probability  zzt+ 1. People are assumed to retire at age 65 and the
maximum  life span is 120 years. Suppose  also that the only assets available  in the economy are
government securities  with a fixed  rate of return of r.  For simplification,  assume furthermore
that a utility function with constant relative risk aversion governs consumption choices C:.
Under these assumptions,  a worker solves  the following  optimization  problem:
1  120  t
max  1  (  + S)  C,~'  H  'S  (iF
C  =65  5=65
s.t.  C, = (I + r) W, - W,+,  (2)
W1 20 2  0  (3,1-4 -
y represents the utility function parameter that determines  the degree of risk aversion and 3
stands for the pure rate of time preference,  the discount  factor for future utility. The model can
be solved using  the following  standard first-order  conditions  (Euler equations):
Cy7,  =  ,  +  )  (4)
As shown by equation (4),  optimal  consumption  growth depends on (a) the risk aversion
of the retiree; (b) the rate of return that can be earned in the market; and (c) the impatience  of
the retiree, which in this case is represented by both the pure rate of time preference a  and
survival  probabilities T. Generally speaking,  more consumption is allocated  to those periods in
which a retiree  is more liely to be alive.
Because a retiree is uncertain about the actual  length of life, he or she must self-insure
against  longevity  risk by always  saving some wealth for the possible continuation of life. As a
result, those  workers who die before the maximum length of  life leave some unintended
bequests-wealth  they were unable to  consume owing to  early death.  How  large those
unintended bequests are depends on the actual  age at death and the risk aversion of the retiree.
The more risk averse  a retiree (the larger y) the flatter is the desired consumption path and the
more wealth  is allocated  to years with low survival  probabilities.
Suppose an insurance  company  offers retirees a contract  that charges  them a prenium Z,
in period t,  pays an annuity a,+l  m period t+1 if the retiree survives,  and nothing if the retiree
dies. Accordingly,  the retiree's  budget constraint (2)  changes  as follows:
C,  = (I + r)  W, - W,+, - Z, a,+  + a,  (S)
A retiree facing budget constraint (5) would decide to either purchase annuities  with all
of his wealth or hold his wealth entirely  in bonds. The retiree  has the choice  between  two assets,
bonds and annuities, and which of the two instruments  is held depends on the relative  rates of
return, that is the relationship  between  the safe rate of return r and the price of annuities Z.  If
1lZ exceeds (1+r), a retiree would only purchase annuities  because he or she could receive a
higher  rate of return 1/Z through full  annuitization.
Actuarially  fair and  frictiorness annuity markets would charge retirees a price Z  =
;r/(l+r).  The insurance company takes into account that a buyer of an annuity may die and
collects  the annuity  with probability  ir  < 1. The insurer  thus charges  a price that is smaller  than
the inverse  of the rate of return, or equivalently  1/Z  > (1+r). As a result,  in a world  with perfect
insurance markets, all retirees should hold their entire wealth in annuities. The latter permits
retirees  to avoid  unintended bequests and reap a higher  rate of return. The observation  that full
annuitization  is optimal  under these circumstances  has first been formalized  by Yaari  1965.The insurance against life span uncertainty offered by annuities can substantially increase
a retiree's utility.  The consumption  path  with annuities an be solved using the  following Euler
equations:
CfY _ cr  +
'+'  '  Z, (1+ ()
(6)
If annuities markets  are actuarially fair and Z, =  +,/(1+)  the Euler  equations collapse
to  an  expression  that  is independent  of survival probabilities  and  simply reflects  the  rate  of
return  and  the  pure  rate  of time preference.  In other  words,  in allocating consumption  the
retiree does not have to consider the risk that in some periods he or she would have very little
wealth to consume because of an unexpectedly long life span.  Figure 1 shows the consumption
path  for a 65-year-old male assuming (a) survival probabilities from the 1996 life tables compiled
by the Office of the Actuary of the U.S. Social Security Administration  1999 2;  (b) normalized
retirement wealth of 100 units; (c) a pure rate of time preference of 1 percent; and (d) an interest
rate of 3 percent. 3
Figure  1. Consumption  Paths With  and  Without
Annuities  Markets
1 4





2  ~~~~~~~No  annuities  markets
Age
Note: rs0.03, 5=0.01, y=2, 1996  life tables  for the U.S., retirement  wealth
normalized  to 100.  Source:  Author's calculations.
2 The life tables do not reflect future mortality  changes. The results should therefore be interpreted as
illustrative  because they rely on a cross  section of survival  probabilities.
3 For illustrative  purposes, an increasing  path of consumption is assumed for perfect annuities  markets,
resulting from an interest rate that exceeds the pure rate of time preference.  Alternativel; a flat or
declining  consumption  path could be constructed  by increasing  the pure rate of time  preference.-6  -
Table  1 illustrates  the welfare  gains  arising  from the existence  of annuities  markets  for
the same  parameter  values  used  for Figure  1.  Under  those  assumptions,  men  could  gain  between
65 and 110 percent of their original  retirement  wealth by having access  to  fair annuities,
depending  on the degree  of risk  aversion,  and  women  could  gain  between  50  and 80  percent.
Table  1.  Welfare  Gains  from  Perfect  Annuities
Markets  (In Percent  of Wealth  at  Age 65)
Gamma  Male  Female
2  65.8  51.6
4  78.8  60.8
10  96.9  73.5
20  108.5  81.5
Note:  r = 0.03,  d = 0.01,  1996  life  tables  for the U.S.
Source:  Author's calculations.
The large  potential  welfare  gains  from pooling  longevity  risk give  rise to the question
why observable  annuities  markets  are so small. In most developed countries,  many retirees  hold
substantial  wealth in non-annuitized  resources and the market for private life annuities is very
small.  If there is so much to be gained from full annuitization,  why are private annuities so
unpopular?  Three possible explanations  emerge:  (a) annuitization  through government programs
and employers,  (b) market imperfections;  and (c) additional factors determining consumption
allocation  in old age  that are missing  from the simple  model outlined above.  The latter two could
also affect  the regulation  of the withdrawal  phase in individual  account systems.
A mudtizan  dyyt  Gor77t  htgrwzs
Most industrialized nations already provide their  retirees with  annuitized resources
through mandatory government  programs  or employer pension coverage. In the United States,
for example,  retirees generally  receive  income from the Old-Age and Survivor  Insurance and are
covered by Medicare, the health insurance program for the elderly.  Both programs reduce
bequeathable  wealth because  they are financed  by payroll  taxes,  which diminish  income available
for retirement saving. The resources  that those programs offer are contingent on survival  and
can therefore not  be  turned over to  potential heirs; in  other words, by paying into the
government retirement and health care system,  potentially bequeathable  wealth is transformed
into annuitized wealth.  Moreover, many employers offer private pensions, which constitute
another form of annuitized  wealth. An extensive  study by Auerbach  et al. 1995 shows that the
overall annuitization  of American  retirees ranged  between 40 and 50 percent between 1987 and
1990. Similarly,  a study by Gustman and others 1997  finds that for the average  U.S. household
expected future government pension payments account for 27 percent of net worth, with
another 23 percent of net worth being  in the form of expected  future private pension payments.- 7 -
Government and private pensions could not on their own explain why people refrain
from annuitizing  their remaining resources as suggested by the simple model above. In the
model, annuitized resources diminish the  bequeathable wealth W  and increase the  annuity
stream a.  Hence, the existence of government and private pension programs would lead to
smaller disposable  resources  for retirees.  In order to explain  observed behavior, namely  the fact
that very few people purchase private annuities in  addition to  pensions received from the
government  and employers,  other aspects  must be added  to the model.
Studying the interaction between existing pension programs and  annuity demand in
industrialized  countries is nonetheless  important. First, those programs interact with annuities
markets  and may  exacerbate  market imperfections. Second, to the extent that observed  behavior
points at demand for annuities,  it could  give  some indication  about the demand for annuities  in a
system  that replaces  a government  program  with individual  accounts.
Available  empirical evidence for the United States does not  support the notion that
people wish to hold less annuitized  wealth than offered to them by government and employers.
In an actuarially  fair insurance  market, annuitization  could be reversed  through purchasing  life
insurance (Yaari  1965). Life insurance is a payment to one's heirs contingent on death, and
purchase of life insurance  therefore permits to convert a current stream of income into a lump
sum wealth payment. However, Brown (1999)  finds that the pattem of life insurance holding
does not  support the conclusion that people attempt to  offset mandatory annuitization by
purchasing  life insurance. Hence, the limited  empirical  evidence  is consistent with the view that
retirees  value  the annuities  in their portfolios.
Market  bnerfan
Insurance markets with imperfect information can give rise to  adverse selection. An
insurance  is by definition  a payment contingent  on an uncertain event. Life annuities  are income
payments contingent on the annuitant's survival. Prices for annuities as for other types of
insurance therefore depend on an insurance company's assessment of the probability  that an
uncertain  event occurs. However,  the particular  risk properties of an insurance customer  may be
unknown to the insurance  company  although  they are known to the customer himself. Because
insurance is more attractive  for the adverse risks (in the case of annuities, those with longer-
than-average  life expectancy)  an insurance  company cannot base its prices on probabilities  for
the average  person but must raise  its prices  to account for the fact that bad risks purchase  more
insurance. That outcome, in turn, may reduce the attractiveness  of insurance further for low-
risk customers,  who might decide to reduce their demand, necessitating  further price increases
by insurance  companies  and further reducing  the attractiveness  of insurance.
Rothschild and Stigitz 1976 have evaluated  the equilibrim  in insurance markets with
adverse selection in a  seminal paper.  They find that  under certain assumptions insurance
companies would segment the market in  different risk classes, which would both  receive
insurance coverage at actuarially  fair prices.  However, insurers would restrict the insurance
coverage of the good risks to  avoid that bad risks have an incentive to  purchase the same
contract.  Eckstein, Eichenbaum, and Peled 1985 applied the Rothschild-Stiglitz  insurance-8 -
equilibrium  to annuity  markets. They show that mandatory  annuitization  might be Pareto-
improving  and argue that their finding supports Diamond's 1977 case for social old-age
insurance.
The Rothschild-Stiglitz  equilibrium  may, however,  not  describe annuity insurance
markets  well. As  Rothschild  and Stiglitz  1976  discuss  in detail,  their  separating  equilibrium  relies
on the assumption  that insurers  can restrict  the quantity  of insurance.  While  it is reasonable  to
assume  that insurers  can  restrict  basic  insurance  against  automobile  accidents  or health  problems
because  it makes  little  sense  to purchase  that insurance  twice,  quantity  constraints  may  not be
applicable  to  annuity  insurance. Annuities  offer a stream  of income and nothing  prevents
people  from purchasing  an income  stream  from different  insurers  to circumvent  any  quantity
restnction. If insurers  can only  control  prices  but not the overall  quantity,  the price  will  be less
favorable  for low risks  and more favorable  for high risks than in a separating  equilibrium.
Moreover,  the price  will  appear  unfavorable  for the average  person  in the population.
The economics  literature  shows  that those  who  decide  to purchase  annuities  live  longer
than average. Friedman  and Warshawsky  1988,  1990  and more recently  Mitchell  and others
1999  demonstrate  that life  armuities  in the United  States  tend to more  expensive  than could  be
expected  from average  life expectancy.  In particular,  Mitchell  and others  calculate  that for the
average  65-year-old  male,  the value  of an annuity  stream  is between  15  and 25 percent  less  than
could  be expected  from average  life tables. They also  find that about  half of that reduction  is
caused  by the fact that annuitants  live  longer than the average  American,  with the remainder
reflecting  overhead  costs.  Finkelstein  and Poterba 1999  report that the value of voluntary
annuities  for 65-year-old  males  in the United  Kingdom  is between  10  and 15  percent  lower  than
average  life tables  would  predict. More  than 60 percent  of that reduction  in value  is caused  by
the longer  lives  of annuitants  compared  with  the average  populations.
The observation  that the value of annuity streams  falls short of what would be
considered  actuarially  fair  for an average  retiree  could  be attributed  to two  factors.  The first  has
been  mentioned  above:  adverse  selection,  the possibility  that annuitants  know  more  about  their
longevity  than insurers  and thus are more likely  to purchase  annuities. However,  in both the
United  States  and Great  Britain,  longevity  is tied to lifetime  income,  and richer  people  tend to
live longer. Economic  theory would predict that people  with more income  purchase  more
annuities.  Thus,  the fact  that annuitants  live  longer  than  average  could  also  reflect  a second  fact,
namely  the income-mortality  correlation. In other words, higher-income  people buy more
annuities  because  they  have  more wealth,  and the observation  that annuitants  live  longer  than
average  arises  because  higher-income  people  also  tend  to live  longer.
Whatever  the exact  explanation  for the observed  longer  lives  of annuitants,  the lack  of
actuarial  fairness  for the average  retiree on its own cannot  explain  the small  private  annuity
demand. Friedman  and Warshawsky  1988 impose  the observable  gap between actual and
actuarial  fair annuities  on a model  similar  to the one outlined  above  by increasing  the price  of
annuities  Z. They  conclude  that even  in the presence  of an annuity  provided  by a public  pension
program,  prices  would  have to be much higher  to prevent  annuity  purchases  in the private
annuities  market. Walliser  1997a  derives  annuity  prices  endogenously  in a simulation  model  of
pnvate  annuity  demand  with heterogeneous  agents  and  a public  pension  programL  Such  a model
can reproduce  observable  differences  between  equilibrium  annuity  prices and actuarially  fair-9  -
prices  (the so-called load factor) but does not drive people out of the annuities markets.  Figure
2 shows the  load  factors  for  life annuities  resulting from the  interaction  of optimizing  agents
differing  in income  and  survival probabilities. 4 For  example, the model produces  equilibrium
annuity  prices for  65-year-old males that  are about  8 percent  higher than  those  derived  from
average survival probabilities. The  magnitude  of load  factors  corresponds  to  the  load  factors
attributable to  adverse selection found  by Mitchell and others  1999. However, despite the lack
of actuarial fairness for the average retiree, the model does not predict that people drop entirely
out of the  annuities market unless they wish to  consume less than their public pension.  Hence,
market  imperfections  that  raise annuity prices by the  same percentage observed  in the United
States and the  United  Kingdom  cannot  on their  own  explain why people prefer  to  hold non-
annuitized wealth.
Figure 2.  Percentage  Increase in Annuity Prices for Males and Females
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Source:  Walliser  1997a.
4 Another implication  of his model  is that a large proportion of the increase  in annuity  prices  is caused  by
the correlation  between  income and mortality  rather than classic  adverse  selection.- 10  -
A second possible imperfection of annuities markets stems from transaction costs.  If
renegotiating a  contract  every period involves sufficiently high transaction costs  for  the
insurance  company and the annuitant, long-term  contracts may be an attractive  option. Indeed,
most annuity and life insurance companies face large costs from selling  contracts through their
sales force 5, and most observable  contracts are long-term arrangements.  As Yagi and Nishigaki
1993 show, those contracts have the consequence  that the annuitant  may not be able to match
the annuity payments to his consumption.  Therefore, retirees must optimize their consumption
path through additional  saving at the interest rate r if they desire  to increase consumption over
time.  Moreover, if annuity contracts are closed at one point in time, the rate of return an
annuitant reaps from the contract will be constant over time rather than vary with conditional
survival  probabilities  as in the model outlined above. As a result,  the annuitant  would change his
consumption path and allocate  more consumption  to the earlier  years of retirement. Formally,  a
constant life armuity in an actuarially  fair market would cost the following  amount Z in each
period t:
Z  ~  20  (1±r)65IH;r,jj/56  (7) Z  = (Yst=65  (1+r  T  S) 5
s=65
The price Z for a constant annuity purchased at age 65 initially  falls short of the tirne-
varying  price Z, and later exceeds  Z, of an actuarially  fair,  time-varying  annuity. As can be seen
from equation (6), the constant price would lead retirees to reduce their consumption growth
and increase  consumption earlier  in life.
Best  Motns azd  Inr,evnidy  Insranae
Pensioners may want to leave bequests to their children or relatives for a variety of
reasons. For example,  they might include their children's  utility  directly  in their considerations,
receive  joy from giving  money (without  caring directly  about the utility  of their children),  or use
bequests as a disciplining  device  to receive  attention and care in old age  (Bernheirn,  Shleifer,  and
Summers 1985). Whatever the reason, the desire  to bequeath reduces the incentive  to annuitize
wealth  at retirement.
Consider the allocation of wealth between bequeathable and annuitized wealth with a
joy-of-giving  bequest  motive as in Fischer 1973. Assuming  for simplification  that bequests enter
utility  in the same fashion as other consumption,  the utility  function (1) changes  as follows:
S Warshawsky  (1998)  reports  that in the state  of New  York  sales  conmmissions  can  be as large  as the
legally  imposed  limit  of 7 percent  of the annuity  premium.max  1  6512(C,+0 (I  7  +,+1  W)  1  (8) max  +~~~6  s='65
77,  stands for the relative  utility  weight  of bequests made at the beginning  of age t,  and W,
for the respective bequest, which equals non-annuitized  wealth.  The problem can be solved
recursively  from the last period of life when death is certain  and the purchase of annuities  would
be irrational (see Fischer 1973,  and Friedman and Warshawsky  1988). Figure 3 shows the paths
of consumption and bequeathable wealth for different ages. With utility  weights for bequests
generating  bequests of about 4 times annual consumption,  actuarially  fair annuity markets,  and a
risk preference  parameter of 2, about 60 percent of wealth  would be annuitized  at age 65. This
share would fall  with age. Moreover,  overhead costs for annuities  would  furthermore reduce  the
attractiveness of annuities as would the existence  of a social security program that provides
annuity  income (see Fnredman  and Warshawsky  1990).
Figure  3. Annuitized  and  Bequeathable  Wealth  in a Life-
Cycle  Model  with  Bequest  Nbtives
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Note:  r=0.03,  i5=0.01,  b  2, 1996  life  tables  for the  U.S.,  retirernentwealth
normalized  to 100.
Source:  Author's calculations- 12 -
Family annuity contracts may be another reason why people refrain from purchasing
private annuities. If family members  jointly optimize  their joint consumption path while taking
into account individual  survival  probabilities,  they could achieve  substantial  welfare gains over a
situation without annuities markets.  Kotlikoff and Spivak 1981 calculate  that a two-person
household  with identical survival  probabilities  could achieve  almost 50 percent of the utility  level
achievable  with fair annuities markets. 6 The utility gain rises the more household members
participate in the intra-family  insurance scheme, and those schemes could be more attractive if
private annuities  are costly  owing  to adverse  selection  or transaction  costs.
Empirical evidence in the United States points does not support risk sharing within
extended families.  Altonji, Hayashi, and  Kotlikoff 1992, 1997 find  that  the  pattern  of
consumption and income transfers between households belonging  to the same extended family
is not consistent with perfect risk sharing. However, the studies cannot rule out limited risk-
sharing arrangements,  for example between couples,  which would still crowd out life annuity
demand,  particularly in  the  presence  of  government and  employer-provided pensions.
Moreover, to the extent that  families  in less developed countries are larger and encompass
several generations  living  together, implicit  intrafamily  insurance  could be very important,  with
the concomitant  decline  in observable  annuity  demand.
Health  ad  Long-tenm  Ca-m  Innwnce
The discussion has thus far assumed that retirees face uncertainty about the length of
their life.  However, other risks loom in old age. In particular,  health care spending and long-
term care needs rise with old age. To the extent  that insurance  markets for health and long-term
care insurance are imperfect, retirees might wish to keep a stock of non-annuitized  wealth in
order to meet sudden expensive  medical  care needs.
Significant  extensions to the standard model are necessary  to explain a rational non-
purchase of annuities. Simply  adding health risks in a similar  fashion as longevity risk to the
above model without bequest motive would not result in a reduction in annuity insurance. If
annuity contracts can be renewed annually  the retiree could still reap a higher rate of return by
annuitizing  all wealth notwithstanding  the lack of health or long-term care insurance markets.
However, as discussed  earlier,  transaction costs may lead to non-reversable  long-term contracts.
In that  case, the retiree might not be able to  meet the health care spending out of current
income and might  keep a buffer stock of non-annuitized  wealth.
Lack of control over long-term care spending could also explain why retirees refrain
from fully  annuitizing  their wealth. Richter and Ritzberger  1995  analyze  a principal-agent  model
of long-term care insurance.  If long-tern  care insurance is unavailable and retirees cannot
control the quantity of care once they become frail, retirees must provide incentives  to  their
6 For a discussion  of the demand  for joint  life annuities  and the consumption  allocation  of couples,  see
Brown  and Poterba 1999. Hurd 1999  discusses  a life-cycle  model for couples  and the interaction
between  observable  bequests  and  intra-family  insurance.- 13 -
caregivers  to provide adequate  care. If health risks and longevity  risks  are positively  correlated,  it
can be shown that it is optimal not to annuitize  all wealth. The result follows  because holding
non-annuitived  wealth allows  to hedge against  long-term care risks.
Portflio  GIi
Generally  speaking,  extending  the model to include  risky  assets could not explain  why people do
not purchase annuities. The model outlined  above assumes  that there exists only a safe asset in
the economy.  Replacing  the safe asset with a risky asset would not alter the analysis. The safe
return r would sirnply have to  be replaced  with an expected rate of return, implying  that the
return to annuities would also be uncertain.  If both risky and non-risky assets coexist in the
economy, annuities could be backed by a set of both assets reflecting  the optimal portfolio
allocation  of the retiree,  and full annuitization  of wealth  would remain optimal.
The portfolio of annuities may differ  from the desired  portfolio choices  for two reasons.
First, many governnents offer some guarantees  for annuity payments.  However, in return for
that guarantee,  they impose certain portfolio restrictions on annuity companies  to linit the risk
of failure. As a result of those restrictions, fairly  conservative  investment portfolios could be
required for annuities, and retirees might choose to  purchase risky assets in addition to  the
annuity.
Second, the annuities backed by risky portfolios, so-called variable annuities that  are
offered in the United States, are investment-insurance  hybrids.  Because both the investment
firm and the insurance firm charge fees, variable  annuities  tend to cost substantially  more than
investments in the underlying portfolio without annuity component.  As a result of the high
costs, vanable annuities have become more of a tax shelter for high-income savers than  a
product that insures against  longevity  risks.
Another portfolio risk stems from inflation. Few governments  offer indexed bonds that
could be employed to back an inflation-protected  annuity. Moreover, in countries where they
exist, the maikets for inflation-indexed  bonds are thin.  As a result, very few annuity  products
protect against inflation risk. However, even if such products are widely available as in the
United Kingdom, they are reportedly not very popular among retirees. Brown and others 1999
calculate  that the money's worth (expected  discounted present value of the annuity divided by
the price of the annuity) of inflation-indexed  annuities  in Britain is about 5 percentage  points
lower than the money's  worth of standard annuities. That difference  could be interpreted as the
cost of inflation  protection and is apparently  more than many retirees  are willing  to pay.
Policy  I*plat
The previous discussion demonstrates  that the decision  about consumption allocation  in
old age  is complex and that many  choices remain  ill understood. It is therefore difficult  to draw a
single conclusion or guiding principle from economic theory for the design of the vithdrawal
phase in individual  account systems. Instead, policy recommnendations  for the design of the- 14 -
withdrawal  phase  in individual  account  systems  should  take into account  a whole  set of issues.
How strictly  withdrawals  are regulated  and which  forms they take would  depend  on country-
specific  circumstances  including  the way  in which  a society  cares  for their  elderly  and how  large  a
role  the government  plays  in providing  a safety  net and  medical  insurance.
The lack  of annuity  demand  in industrialized  countries  is likely  caused  by a number  of
factors, and adverse  selection  is probably not the  main reason why people refrain from
converting  their  wealth  into annuities.  The evidence  for the United  States  shows  that annuitants
have  a longer  life expectancy  than those  who do not purchase  annuities. However,  a sirnilar
outcome  could be result from the correlation  between income and longevity  and the link
between  the size  of public  pension  benefits  and longevity.  Moreover,  theoretical  results  reveal
that unfavorably  priced  annuities  alone  could  not explain  the lack  of demand.  Bequest  motives,
self-insurance  against  health risks, the  inability  to  adapt annuities  exactly  to  the  desired
consumption  stream,  lack  of inflation  protection  and most importantly  the existence  of a public
pension system  all contribute  to the weak  demand for additional  annuity  coverage. Hence,
regulating  withdrawals  should  aim at more than simply  avoiding  adverse  selection  in annuities
markets.
III. REGULATION OF THE WITHDRAWAL PHASE
Most econornists  believe  that the provision  for old-age  consumption  should  be at least
partly  mandatory.  The rationale  for enforcing  retirement  savings  is that workers  may  be myopic
or would  otherwise  rely  on publicly  provided  income  support  because  the government  cannot
credibly  commit  to let retirees  starve. That argument  can be extended  to the withdrawal  phase
of individual  account  systems.  Insurance  market  imperfections  would  lend further  support  for
governnent  regulation  of withdrawals.
A variety  of insurance  products  could  be considered  to tailor  withdrawals  to a retiree's
needs.  In which way those products should be regulated  depends on the size of other
government  programs,  government  guarantees  for annuity  firms,  and equity  considerations  in
annuity  pricing.
Ransfor  GC  o  wn*2  Inten
Workers  and retirees  may be uninformed  or myopic.  Providing  for old age and
allocating  savings  requires  forward  looking  and rational  choices.  Because  some  of those  choices
are complex,  workers  and retirees  may fail to provide  adequately  for their retirement  years.
Bayer, Bernheim  and Scholz 1996 offer empirical  evidence  that educational  support can
markedly  improve  retirement  saving  choices.  Similar  arguments  apply to the withdrawal  of
retirement  savings.  Moreover,  retirees  may  simply  be impatient  and  therefore  consume  more  of
their retirement  savings  than would be considered  prudent from a paternalistic  perspective.
Imposing rules on withdrawals  would force retirees to  act within boundaries  set by the
government.- 15 -
The  lack  of  forward-looking behavior may  also  result  from  explicit or  implicit
government income guarantees. If the government cannot credibly commit to ignore retirees
without sufficient means, those with sufficient retirement savings  may feel compelled  to spend
down their wealth and rely on government  income support programs afterwards,  a moral hazard
created by government guarantees. Withdrawal  rules would avoid  the potential costs of a large
retiree population drawing welfare benefits and  ensure that retirement savings are used for
consumption  in old age.
Aspects of the  insurance market may also warrant government intervention.  First,
government withdrawal rules may change the pricing of annuities by expanding the pool of
annuitants and possibly limiting people from dropping out  of the market based on private
information.  Accordingly,  adverse selection could be  limited by government intervention.
Moreover, in many countries the government guarantees at least a portion of the annuity
payments  in case an annuity company fails. Because government guarantees could otherwise
encourage  overly  risky investment strategies  of insurance firms, some government regulation  of
insurance  portfolios  would be warranted.
Types  of Widxra=Uls
The theoretical discussion in section II focused on simple life annuities as a type of
withdrawal. However, financial  markets in industrialized  countries have developed a whole set
of annuity products.  In general, those products can be distinguished  by the following five
characteristics  (see also Poterba 1997):
7hemahxdofpaynert.  Some annuities  must be purchased  with a single  premium (single  premium
annuities);  others must be purchased with a series of annual payments (fixed-annual-premium
annuities,  flexible-premium  annuities).  Retirees in an individual  account system would typically
purchase  their annuity  with a single  prermiurm
7he  nber  of pe  cwled. Annuities can be purchased for an individual  (individual  annuity)  or
several  people (oint life annuities,  joint and survivor annuities).
Ihe uagt  idfor  bn~z.  Annuity payments  can begin immediately  after the purchase of the
annuity (immediate  annuity), or the annuity can be deferred until a certain age is reached
(deferred  annuity). Both options could be attractive  in an individual  account system.  Currently,
individual  accounts  are typically  converted  into immediate  annuities.
The natwm  of paos.  Life annuities provide income until the death of the annuitant. A fixed-
payments-certain  life annuity provides payments until the  death of the  annuitant and also
guarantees  a certain number of payments even if the annuitant dies early.  Refund annuities
return a portion of the premium should the annuitant die before a certain date. Some annuities
provide payments only for an agreed-upon fixed period of time so that payments may end
before the death of the annuitant. Those annuities do not insure against  life span uncertainty.
They resemble  so-called  phased withdrawals,  which divide  the account balance  according  to the
expected  remaining  life span.- 16-
7he  zwiability  of  payots. Annuity payouts can be fixed or variable. A fixed  annuity guarantees  a
minimum payment. The "nonparticipating"  fixed annuity pays a constant stream of annuity
payments whereas  a "participating"  fixed annuity provides a guaranteed  minirnum payment and
additional dividend payments that  depend on the performance of the insurance company's
investment portfolio. Variable  annuities  also rise and fall with the performance  of the annuity
insurer's investment  portfolio,  but they do not guarantee  a minimum  payment.
Issues  oz  Reg=i2g W1zd&rawu1s
For the reasons outlined  above,  there seems  to be a consensus  among  economic analysts
that some regulation  of withdrawals  is reasonable. However, such consensus  does not cover the
details of the regulation. Specific  questions  that need to be answered  include  the following:
*Which  portion of the account balance should be subject to  withdrawal rules and which
portion could be withdrawn  in a lump sum?
The portion of the account balance  that should be preserved for withdrawal  over time
should depend on the  generosity of other  government old-age income support programs.
Imposing withdrawal  rules on retirees has the ultimate goal to limit the potential cost arising
from government income support for the elderly. Hence, the withdrawal  rules would have to
cover only that portion of account balances sufficient  to  finance a level of retirement income
above government welfare  levels. For example,  the Chilean government allows the lump-sum
withdrawal  of those funds that exceed  the level necessary  to purchase an annuity  of 120 percent
of the guaranteed  pension level. Thus, retirees may reduce their income level compared to pre-
retirement  years by spending savings  too quickly,  but their income will  remain high enough such
that they do not qualify  for government  assistance.
How much higher  the income from the individual  accounts should be than a guaranteed
minimum pension depends largely on the rules governing  the income support system.  Rules
should be set such that the retirement income derived from individual  accounts remains above
guaranteed  pension levels  throughout retirement. For example,  if guaranteed  pension levels  rise
with productivity, guaranteed pension levels may catch up with  income withdrawals from
individual  accounts if the latter are faxed  in nominal terms.  Moreover, pension guarantees  may
be smaller  than what would be considered a comfortable level of consumption. Both reasons
would support regulation that sets mandatory income withdrawal from individual accounts
above the pension level guaranteed  by the government.
Regulation  could ensure participation in the insurance market and avoid any adverse
selection. If only a portion of the account balance  must be converted into an annuity or some
other form of withdrawal  such regulation  would effectively  split the insurance market in one
market for regulated  withdrawals  and one market for voluntary  purchases.  Clearly,  both markets
would interact.  The market for regulated  purchases  would not be subject to adverse  selection  but
the market for voluntary purchases  would likely be subject to  even stronger adverse selection
(Walliser  1997b). Imposing  a mandate  on the entire account balance  that would largely  eliminate
the voluntary  market could avoid adverse  selection  but would restrict the flexibility  of retirees to
adapt income streams  to their needs.- 17 -
How extensive the mandate should be  depends thus  largely on the weight of the
argument to  ensure the functioning of insurance markets against the argument for flexible
provision of retirement income.  First, if the accounts provide a relatively small portion of
overall retirement  income, mandatory  purchase of annuities or another form of withdrawal  over
time with the entire account balance  would not restrict the ability  to adapt income streams  to
consumption needs.  (It would, however, affect the  selection in the  market for  voluntary
purchases.) If individual  accounts accumulate  a large proportion of worker's retirement wealth,
some more flexibility  is warranted given  the evidence  that some generous pay-as-you-go  pension
systems  may force retirees to hold too much wealth in annuities.! Second, the portion of the
balance covered by the mandate hinges on the importance of the insurance market argument.
Although people who participate  in annuity  insurance markets in the United States clearly  live
longer than other retirees the extent to which this phenomenon is caused by private information
about life expectancy  is unclear. Further study of the experiences  with newly  emerging  annuities
markets  is necessary  to clarify  that question. However, first figures from Chile seem to indicate
that annuities  are a very popular withdrawal  option (Valdes-Prieco  1998),  especially  among  those
with sufficient  wealth  to retire early.
Which types of withdrawal  should be permitted for the regulated  withdrawal  of the account
balance?
One  of the  major questions is whether only life annuities or  also other  forms of
withdrawal  over time should be allowed. Life annuities  protect the retiree (and potentially  his or
her survivors)  against  the uncertainty  about the length of life. Other products, which distribute
the regulated  portion of the account balance over a certain time span do not  offer such a
protection.  For example, so-called  phased withdrawals  in Chile divide the remaining  account
balance (after a possible lump-sum withdrawal) over the expected length of life taking into
account  the interest accrued over time.
Protecting government finances and  ensuring participation in  the insurance market
would both suggest  prohibiting  phased withdrawals  as alternative  for annuities. Because  phased
withdrawals  do not protect against life span uncertainty, those with unexpectedly  long lives
could qualify for government assistance at the  end  of their life span.  Moreover, phased
withdrawals  would allow those who expect to live only short lives  to  opt out of the annuities
market and thus encourage  adverse  selection.
A second question concerns  the types of annuities  people should be allowed  to purchase
with the regulated  portion of their account. As outlined above, annuities come in a variety of
forms. Some annuities  allow  the refund of wealth to heirs others vary with the performance  of
capital  markets. Refund- and period-certain  annuities  could raise  the concern that thev may  lead
to adverse  selection  in annuities markets because people who choose them presumably  believe
that they  will  not live long. They would therefore prefer to return some of the annuity  premium
7For example,  Borsch-Supan  1994  shows  that  many  German  retirees  save  a substantial  portion  of their
public  pension  income.- 18 -
to their heirs in exchange  for a lower annual  income payment. However,  because  those
annuities  protect  the retiree  against  life span uncertainty  they  do not raise  any issue  of moral
hazard concerning  government  welfare  programs. Thus, government  could allow  retirees  to
choose those options under the condition  that the remaining  income payments  exceed  the
guaranteed  pension  by sufficient  amounts.  The resulting  separation  of the annuities  market  into
subgroups  would  also  support  some  self-selection  of annuitants  into risk  classes.
Some  restriction  on the risk  properties  of so-called  variable  annuities  is necessary.  Most
individual  account  systems  inpose some portfolio restrictions  to  limit the risk of losses,
implictly  protecting  the governnent's  financial  position. For the same  reason,  restricting  the
portfolio  choices  of retirees  in some  ways  is warranted.  One possibility  would  be to restrict  the
income  variation  to the portion  of retirement  income  that is above the guaranteed  minimrum
pension,  similar  to the fixed  and participating  annuities  currently  offered  by  TIAA  in the United
States. A fixed  and participating  annuity  guarantees  a minimum  income  payment  for the rest of
life.  The income is raised when the return of the underlying  portfolio exceeds  certain
thresholds.
Inflation  protection  should  be mandatory  for at least  the portion of accounts  whose
withdrawal  over time is regulated. Otherwise,  the real value of the pension  could decline
substantially  and surprisingly,  necessitating  governrment  support. To the extent  that inflation
protection  is unavailable  in the marketplace,  the government  might have to issue inflation-
indexed  securities  to facilitate  the market-provision  of inflation-protected  annuities. In some
countries  with limited  financial  market capacity  for government  securities,  ensuring  inflation
protection  may  therefore  be a difficult  task.
Withdrawals  should ensure some form of  survivor  protection.  Without sufficient
regulation,  some  retirees  could  choose  to tie the annuity  only to their own survival. If their
surviving  spouses  were  without  other  means,  the government  would  have  to step in with income
support.  In essence,  those retirees  would free ride on the government's  income support
program by choosing  a higher annuity payment  for themselves  without protecting  their
survivors.
v  At what  age  should  the  withdrawal  begin?
The withdrawal  age  poses  the problems  of portfolio  risk  and adverse  selection.  Unless
the portfolio  during  the accumulation  phase  coincides  exactly  with the portfolio  backing  the life
annuity, annuitization  implies  a portfolio change.  Because  of large fluctuations  in equity
markets,  enforcing  portfolio  switches  at one point in time may  be perceived  as unfavorable.
However,  it must be noted that, unless equity markets have a mean-reverting  property,
predicting  the market  movement  is impossible,  and allowing  retirees  to choose  the point of
conversion  themselves  does not resolve  the underlying  portfolio  risk.  Thus, while allowing
retirees  to choose  the age of conversion  may  give  additional  flexibility,  it does not solve  the
portfolio  risk  problem.  Instead,  it encourages  adverse  selection  because  those  with  illnesses  and
shorter  life expectancy  will never  annuitize  their  wealth  or wait  until  the greatest  possible  age.
The best solution  to portfolio  risk  thus would  be to limit  the portfolio  changes  necessary  at- 19-
retirement  by  allowing annuity  providers  to  offer  variable  annuities  based  on  a  variety  of
investment portfolios.
*  What restrictions should be imposed on annuity providers in pricing annuities?
Annuity companies  could attempt  to  separate annuitants into  risk classes based on  sex,
marital status, forebears'  longevity, income,  and  health  habits.  However,  such  pricing would
cause conflicts between the  protection  of individual privacy and the informational  demands of
annuity insurers.  For  example, would insurance companies be able to use the results of genetic
tests,  or  would  that  information  remain  private?  The  extent  to  which  privacy  remained
protected  would  generally  determine  the  ability of  certain  groups  to  reduce  their  annuity
coverage based on private information  about longevity prospects.
Equaly  difficult is  the  distinction  between  market  separation  and  the  perception  of
discrimination.  For  example, would insurers  be allowed to  sell differently  priced annuities to
men and women, or would unisex policies be required?  Many may perceive it as discriminatory
if women  receive a  smaller pension  than  men  for  an  identical insurance  premnium.  However,
from a pure insurance perspective, a lower pension for women is actuarially fair because women
tend  to live longer than  men,  and, thus, their retirement  savings likely have to provide  income
over a longer time span.
If annuitization is not mandatory,  enforcing the same premiurm for  different risk classes
would  make  mandatory  annuities  unattractive  to  people  with  shorter  life  expectancy  and
exacerbate adverse selection.  Specifically, if there  are alternatives to  full annuitization  (phased
withdrawals, say) those  with  shorter  life  expectancy  might  simply  stay  out  of the  annuities
market, raising the price of annuities for other market participants.
If annuitization is mandatory, prohibiting the segmentation of annuitants into risk classes
implies redistribution  among  different  risk  classes.  If  low-income  retirees  with  shorter  life
expectancy pay the  sarne price  for  an annuity  as high-income  people  with  above-average life
expectancy, wealth is redistributed  from  the  low-income  retiree to  the  high-income  one.  If
unisex annuities are required, resources will be implicitly redistributed from men to women since
women live longer on  average than  men.  Both types of redistribution  could have  substantial
effects on the welfare of certain groups (Walliser 1997b).
*  How should annuity insurers' portfolios be regulated?
If policymakers implicitly or explicitly guarantee the annuity contracts offered by private
insurers, regulation  of  annuity  insurers'  funds  would  be  necessary  to  reduce  the  risk  to  the
government.  Annuity  insurers  are  exposed  to  the  risk  that  their  investment  portfolios
underperform  or  their  investments  fail. As a  result,  a  company  may  be  unable  to  meet  its
obligations, and policymakers may feel obliged to  help  out retirees whose  annuities  cannot be
paid  any  more.  One  possibility is to  create  some  formal  insurance  for  annuity  companies.- 20 -
However, such insurance could lead to overly risky investment strategies of annuity insurers
unless it is properly priced or policymakers  develop regulations to limit risk  taking. Hence, if
implicit or explicit  guarantees are extended to annuity payments,  policymakers  mnight  decide to
restrict portfolio choices of annuity firms.  Effectively, regulating the insurer's investment
choices or the annuitant's investment  choices (for variable  annuities)  as discussed  above are just
two manifestations  of the same issue: the entity that bears the risk may take on too much risk if
the government offers guarantees.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
Theoretical  models of consumption in old age depend on a variety of factors, including
uncertainty  about longevity,  health and long-term care, portfolio choices and risk, and bequests
and intrafamily arrangements.  Although there is considerable evidence that annuitants live
longer than  average retirees, the  extent to  which this  phenomenon  is caused by private
information about life span uncertainty is uncertain.  As  a  result, the  regulation of  the
withdrawals  from individual  accounts has to strike a balance  between flexible  arrangements  that
can accommodate individual circumstances and the reduction of adverse selection that may
affect the pricing of insurance  products.
Regulation  should ensure a sufficient inflation-protected stream of retirement income
with coverage  of survivors. Annuitization of a portion of accumulated  funds with some survivor
coverage should be mandatory to reduce the government's exposure to welfare payments for
retirees  with insufficient  means. However, some flexibility  over the choice of annuities  could be
permitted, enabling retirees who expect shorter lives to  purchase refund annuities.  Funds
exceeding the amounts necessary to  finance a  sufficient retirement income could be made
available  for lump-sum withdrawals. Such option would allow the retiree to choose among a
variety of withdrawal  options and ensure  that individual  circumstances  and needs could be met.- 21 -
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